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In a climate of rapid technological change, it is important to evaluate policies on 
the innovation incentives that result from the introduction of intellectual property rights 
as they relate to agricultural genetic resources.  In this paper, we use a stylized model of 
cumulative innovation to explore the dynamics of introducing patent protection with 
licensing agreements, and then we contrast those results with the comparative-statics 
viewpoint. We also investigate the dynamic effects of claims on behalf of farmers on the 
profits of private crop breeders whose output is newly protected by patents. 
We show that the choices about patent life and licensing share that optimize 
worldwide dynamic social welfare can be quite different from the values that maximize 
steady-state social welfare. Further, recognition of farmers’ rights entails a dynamic 
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DYNAMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PATENTING FOR CROP GENETIC 
RESOURCES 
 





Genetic resources have substantial economic value as repositories of genetic 
information that provide inputs into the development of plant varieties, drugs, and 
pharmaceuticals.  It is estimated that about half of the world’s medicines contain 
compounds from a natural origin (Schery 1972), while approximately half of the increased 
yield of major crops is commonly attributed to genetic improvement.
1  The high value of 
genetic resources available through certain plants and animals has long been recognized in 
the history of crop improvement (Juma 1989, Huffman and Evenson 1993). 
Until the 1980s, the international trend was toward wider and easier access to wild 
and weedy plants and to farmers’ crop varieties as the “common heritage of mankind,” a 
concept encouraged by developed countries￿the major users of such breeding material.  
Indeed, if investments were to be made in research into crop plant breeding, until 
recently, in most cases they were necessarily public.  For plants like annual crops that 
have a short reproductive cycle with seed easily saved by farmers and planted again to 
breed true-to-type, a high premium for new breeding material￿called germplasm￿was 
infeasible.  
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Changes in the technological, biological, legal, and political environments in 
which genetic resources are used have been dramatic over the past few decades.  
Advances in technology have sufficiently facilitated accurate identification of plant 
varieties and their parentage to enable laws against misappropriation to be enforced in 
circumstances where conventional observation would be indecisive.  Advances in 
biotechnology have made it possible to identify genes associated with diverse traits￿in 
particular resistance to pests and diseases￿and to transfer these genes between different 
varieties and even between different species.  These advances have encouraged the vision 
that countries in geographic centers of biodiversity might hold, within their borders, life 
forms highly attractive to developed countries, though the possible rewards from using 
those resources may be modest (Wright 1997). 
Judicial and administrative decisions, particularly in the United States, have 
accelerated a trend toward privatization that was initiated earlier in the century through 
several means of protection for plant genetic resources, and the validation of utility 
patents on life forms and genetic materials.
2  The major elements of intellectual property 
protection for plants are more diverse than for most other subject areas.  This fact may be 
at least partly explained by the need to develop substitutes for conventional patent 
protection in the years prior to availability of utility patent protection. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 See, for example, Duvick (1984) for evidence on corn in the United States from 
trials comparing new and older varieties in yield tests. 
2 Rights to plant varieties and other life forms, or to their genetic materials, are 
now generally classified as “intellectual property rights,” even though the information 
that is protected is not necessarily the product of intellectual effort, but rather genetic 
code that might not even be understood by the “inventor.”  
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Internationally, developed countries have insisted that other participants commit 
to developing a system of intellectual property rights that covers life forms including 
plants and genes.  Patents or other sui generis (“of their own kind”) means of protection 
must now be adopted by many countries before a rapidly approaching deadline, unless 
current GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) agreements are  revised.
3  
Developing countries, for their part, are asserting claims on genetic resources originating 
within their borders, ending the free access of plant breeders to genetic materials in situ in 
farmers’ fields and other areas in centers of biodiversity.  Though their efforts have not 
materialized in a legal sense, developing countries won endorsement of the concept of 
“farmers’ rights” in the FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources 
(FAO Resolution C 5/89).
4 
In this new policy environment, the question of the merits of adopting intellectual 
property protection over plant genetic resources has become a major focus of political 
debate in both developing and developed countries, as well as in public agricultural 
institutions such as the International Agricultural Research Centers (CGIAR).  The issue 
of the possible positive economic effects of intellectual property protection for plants is  
                                                 
3 Article 27(1) on the 1994 Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) agreements states that “members are required to provide for the protection of 
plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any 
combination thereof.” The deadlines for the implementation of the protection over plant 
varieties are 1995 for developed countries, 2000 for developing countries, and 2005 for 
least developed countries.  In general, a sui generis system implies plant breeders’ rights 
such as Plant Variety Protection Act in the U.S. or UPOV Acts. See Leskien and Flitner 
(1997) for more detail. 
4 “Farmers’ rights” are defined as rights arising from the past, present, and future 
contributions of farmers in the conservation and development of plant genetic resources. 
However, farmers’ rights are a moral commitment rather than legal rights, and they did 
not grant farmers ownership of genetic resources.  
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obviously an important input into this larger policy debate.  In this paper, we consider the 
effects of policy regarding property rights to plant genetic resources for agriculture, at a 
time when the rights of seed producers to protect their innovations from expropriation are 
being initially recognized or strengthened in most countries.  Because of the cumulative 
nature of plant-breeding processes for yield enhancement, the issue is essentially a 
multiperiod one.  Moreover, because we are considering policy changes in the intellectual 
property rights over plants, the issue is clearly dynamic.  Thus, the issue we address is an 
example of policy change in a chain of cumulative innovation, in which links in the chain 
and evidence of progress and causality are more explicit than is usual in innovation 
markets.  This example may prove instructive in forming intellectual property protection 
policy in more complex environments. 
Using a necessarily highly stylized model, we explore the dynamics of the 
introduction of patent protection with licensing to subservient patents, and contrast the 
results with the comparative-statics viewpoint that has been the focus of the few infinite-
horizon models of R&D and patenting available up to now.  We also investigate the 
dynamic effects of a strong form of claims on farmers’ rights to the profits of private crop 
breeders whose output is newly protected by patents.  We show that recognition of 
farmers’ rights entails a dynamic welfare loss to producers and consumers that is not 
revealed in a comparative-statics analysis.  Further, the decisions about patent life and 
licensing share that optimize worldwide dynamic social welfare can be quite different 
from the values that maximize the steady-state social welfare. 
The paper is organized in five main sections.  First we review the nature and use 
of agricultural genetic resources in plant breeding, and then we introduce the model of  
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cumulative innovation, leading to an analysis of the effects of alternative patent systems 
on the innovator’s incentive using the argument of dynamic programming.  Next we 
investigate the dynamic implications of patent systems and farmers’ rights through 
numerical analysis, and finally offer some concluding remarks.  
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2. THE NATURE AND USE OF AGRICULTURAL GENETIC RESOURCES 
To properly consider the questions of this paper, it is necessary to be more precise 
about the types of genetic resources we are considering.  Speaking generally, useful plant 
genetic resources make contributions to innovation that fall into two classes.  In the first 
class are plants that test positive for a specific qualitative trait, such as resistance to a pest 
or disease in the case of agricultural applications, or anticancer or antibiotic properties in 
the case of pharmaceuticals.  With respect to potential pharmaceuticals, the relevant plant 
traits are commercialized either directly, by extraction from the wild plants, or indirectly 
via the development of synthetic substitutes for naturally occurring compounds.  The 
consumer is the target market for these products.  In agriculture, pest and disease 
resistance are often associated with one or a small number of genes that can be identified 
and transferred to plant breeders who incorporate these genes in plant varieties to be sold 
to agricultural producers.  These genes are often direct substitutes for chemical 
pesticides.
5 
The second class of genetic resources are those valued for their quantitative￿e.g., 
yield-increasing￿traits.  Such traits in general are not readily associated with specific 
genes; indeed they might only be apparent via their combined effects on crop yield.
6 
While it is relatively simple to evaluate the contribution of a single gene in the 
development of pharmaceuticals or pest- and disease-resistant crops, it is extremely 
difficult to determine the relative contributions of genes to a quantitative trait that affects 
                                                 
5 Herbicide resistance genes are now another important set of biotechnology 
products not found by selection.  
6 Dwarfing genes, important in modern high-yield wheat and rice varieties, are 
prominent exceptions.  
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the overall performance of a given plant variety.  Traits can only be readily transferred 
via their presence in elite parent lines using traditional breeding methods.  It appears that 
the quantitative-yield trait has no comparable significance in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Thus, a modern high-yield crop variety represents the latest achievement in a 
long, cumulative sequence of yield improvements over the landraces and perhaps the 
wild varieties that are its ancestors.  Small portions of genetic material associated with 
specific traits may have been added from otherwise undesirable varieties, but the 
continued development of higher-yield varieties is essentially a cumulative process of 
incremental improvements on the genetic resources responsible for current yield levels. 
In the context of this cumulative innovative chain, the implications of changes in 
the intellectual property protection can be quite different from those revealed in the 
common one-period (Nordhaus, 1969; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; and Klemperer, 1990) 
or two-period (Scotchmer, 1991, 1996; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Chang, 1995; and 
Matutes et al., 1996) models, or in the available multiperiod models that take a 
comparative-statics approach (Horowitz and Lai, 1996; O’Donoghue, 1998; and 
O’Donoghue et al., 1998). We substantiate these claims in the next section, using a 
simple, and necessarily stylized, dynamic model.  
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3. A MODEL OF CUMULATIVE INNOVATION 
ASSUMPTIONS 
We assume an infinite sequence of innovation process, where each innovation is 
based upon previous innovations.
7  Innovations occur stochastically, and each innovation 
is the product of an innovation race.  During each innovation race, n homogeneous 
innovators compete to be the first to develop an innovation whose flow value is v.  The 
value v can be regarded as the amount of the “willingness-to-pay” by consumers who demand 
one unit of the product per period, or as the amount of quality improvement.  In this model, we 
interpret v as the value of the reduction in production cost from each innovation.  Another 
simplifying assumption, following O’Donoghue et al. (1998), and in contrast to Horowitz and 
Lai (1996), is that successful innovators place zero probability on the event that they will also 
be first to find the next innovation based on their innovation.  Each successful innovator obtains 
a patent to appropriate any rent from his or her innovation; that is, the possibility of trade 
secret as an alternative means of protection is assumed away. 
Patents affect an innovator’s incentive, which in turn changes the rate of 
innovation in the industry.  We assume that the scope of the patent is broad enough, and 
the durability of the technological advantage strong enough, to make the effective patent 
life equal to the statutory patent life T.
8  This implies that every innovation under the 
                                                 
7 Scotchmer (1991) points out three possible relationships between successive 
innovations: the first innovation a) is a necessary condition for the following innovation, 
b) reduces the cost of achieving the following innovation, or c) accelerates the 
development of the following innovation.  Our model assumes the first relationship. 
8 O’Donoghue et al. (1998) defines effective patent life as the length of time for 
which a patent enables a firm to receive a share of market profits.  A patent effectively  
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overhang of previous patents is infringing, and each innovator should pay licensing fees 
to previous innovators until their patents are expired.  Note that licenses are not given for 
use of the patented product, but for permission to work the next innovation while it is 
subservient to the patent on the current innovation.
9  
The royalty rate a can be set by the government through compulsory licensing, or 
sequentially by each innovator as the Stackelberg leader of subsequent innovators, or by 
innovators as the result of efficient bargaining.  In the following analysis, we simply 
assume a flat royalty rate that is exogenous to each innovator.  One interpretation of this 
assumption is that the royalty rate is regarded as the proxy of patent scope set by the 
government (or the court).
10  In the following analysis, we simply assume a flat royalty 
rate that is exogenous to each innovator. For tractability, we assume a simple licensing 
scheme￿i.e., each innovator pays a license fee solely to the previous innovator, during 
the life of the previous patent, by a share, a, of all income the current innovator receives 
from exploiting his or her innovation and from the license fee of the subsequent 
innovation.
11  
                                                                                                                                                 
terminates either when it expires or when the new innovation is outside the scope of 
previous patents. 
9 To focus on effective changes in the intellectual property rights, we ignore costs 
of information, contracting, and enforcement that can be crucial in determining the 
market structure. 
10 For plant genetic materials, the value of each material is too low to make 
individual agreements, and the public-good nature of some crop varieties may justify the 
use of compulsory licensing. 
11 This scheme of transfer simplifies the calculation and captures the 
intertemporal transfer of license fees among successive innovators.  In a sequence of 
innovations t, t+1, t+2, …, for example, this scheme is analogous to the case where the t 
innovator gets a of the t+1 innovator’s payoff, an order of a
2 of the t+2 innovator’s 
payoff, and so on.  
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The first term on the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (4) is the payoff during 
the overhang period [0, T - t], in which the innovator receives (1 - a) of his or her profit 
(area A in Figure 1a).  The second term on the RHS is the payoff outside of overhang  
[T - t, T], in which the innovator receives the full profit (area B).  The area C in Figure 1a 
is the amount of licensing fee transferred to the previous innovator during the overhang 
period.  Either the first innovator or the innovator who is outside of previous patent can 
capture area C as well as area A and B. 
As the distance from the timing of the previous patent increases, or the period of 
overhang decreases, area C becomes smaller and the current payoff increases, given the 
patent life and the royalty rate.  Figure 1b shows the current payoff as a function of the 
time t, in which the height at time t corresponds to the areas A and B at time t of Figure 
1a.  The current payoff increases from the lowest level at t = 0 (i.e., under the complete 
overhang), and stays at the maximum when t ‡ T (outside of overhang).  When there is no 
licensing agreement among innovators (a = 0) or the previous patent has expired, the 




The total payoff of the second-last innovator at time t￿the addition of the current 
payoff (equation (4)) and the expected payoff (equation (6))￿determines his or her hazard rate 
through equation (2).  This hazard rate is used for the derivation of the expected payoff of the 
third-last innovation in a similar way.  If we continue this process of backward induction, we 
can derive the expected payoff and the hazard rate of a steady-state innovator.  The hazard rate 
of the first innovator can be derived using equation (3) and the expected payoff of a steady-state 
innovator without overhang, analogous to equation (5). 
The hazard rate is endogenously determined, and this intertemporal correlation 
among successive innovators makes it difficult to derive a simple analytic form of the 
payoff function (and hazard rate) for the steady-state innovation.  A numerical calculation 
using the dynamic-programming approach is required to analyze the effect of patent 
systems on the incentive for innovation.  In the next section, before examining the 
numerical solution, we will first sketch the possible effects of the changes in patent 
system on the hazard rates of a first and a steady-state innovator.  
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5. DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF PATENT SYSTEM AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
OF FARMERS' RIGHTS 
DYNAMIC INNOVATION BEHAVIOR 
We numerically solved the general dynamic version of the model for chosen 
parameter values using the dynamic programming approach, as discussed above.  We 
assume an infinite horizon,
17 and use a discrete approximation to the continuous Poisson 
process.  For a given parameterization,
18 the incentive of an innovator￿i.e., the hazard 
rate l￿is a monotonically increasing function of the number of periods for which the 
previous patent will remain valid and the patent life T.  
As shown on the right side of Figure 4, longer patent lives mean higher hazard rates once 
the previous patent has expired.  This also implies that the first innovator always benefits 
from longer patent life.  Longer patent lives also yield higher hazard rates when the 
overhang of the previous patent is a large portion of its patent life T, as is illustrated on 
the left side of Figure 4.  
                                                 
17 The assumption of a constant flow return v to successful innovation in each 
period does modest violence to the interpretation of v as the value of fixed decrement in 
the cost of production. 
18 Unless otherwise specified, the following parameter values are used for the rest 
of figures: r = 0.2, q = 1, e = 0.8, v = 0.3, a = 0.5, and T = 20. The parameter e, which 
indicates the responsiveness of innovation probability to R&D incentive, is an important 
factor in the following analysis. High e implies that innovation is sensitive to R&D 
investment, and the role of expected payoff is more prominent for high e.  
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Figure 4  Hazard-rate functions under alternative patent lives 
 
Figure 5  Hazard-rate functions under alternative royalty rates 
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For moderate overhang, however, a shorter patent life can actually induce a higher 
hazard rate, as is seen in the comparison of the curve for T = 10 relative to the curve for 
T=15, evaluated around ten years from the previous innovation.  The prospect of 
deliverance from overhang encourages increased competition for the next innovation 
(even though a royalty must be paid if a discovery is made before the previous patent 
expires) as the time of expiration of the previous patent draws close.  When the prospect 
is very distant, the effect of extending one’s own patent life dominates the effect of an 
extension of the date when the previous patent will expire. 
When the patent life is fairly short (say T = 4), longer patent life (say, to T = 10) 
increases the hazard rate everywhere, shown in Figure 4.  For a short patent life, the 
timing t
*, defined in equation (8), is likely to be larger than T, and patent life has a 
positive effect on the hazard rate everywhere. 
The hazard rate is also a highly nonlinear function of the royalty rate a.  In Figure 
5, the hazard rate is constant when there is no licensing agreements (a = 0), which 
corresponds to the case of existing models without licensing agreements (e.g., Horowitz 
and Lai 1996).  When the royalty rate a rises from zero, the hazard rate falls if overhang 
is large, and rises if it is small or zero.  But the effects are certainly not monotonic.  
If the royalty rate is confiscatory (i.e., a is close to one), follow-on innovation is 
severely discouraged, reducing the incentives for current research and the overall rate of 
innovation.  The first innovator’s rate of innovation is decreased even when there is no 
overhang from a previous patent￿i.e., the hazard rate with a = 1 after 20 years is less 
than that with a = 0.5 on the right side of Figure 5.  For a very high royalty rate, the 
expected payoff of the first innovator is greatly reduced since the subsequent innovations,  
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if any, occur slowly.  So the first innovator is not better off by charging an excessively 
high royalty rate because the expected payoff is large when there are many subsequent 
innovations within the patent life, and this is achieved through a royalty rate that is less 
than confiscatory. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 
What does this behavior of innovation intensity as represented by the hazard rate 
imply for the welfare effects of the introduction of patents and licensing?  In a situation in 
which access to genetic resources was previously free, the comparative-statics approach 
on welfare effects can be totally misleading.  An increase in the royalty rate from zero 
reduces steady-state social welfare, as Figure 6 shows.  The negative welfare effect of a 
higher royalty via patent overhang dominates the positive effect of increased revenue 
from subsequent patents, as noted by O’Donoghue (1996), for a simple, steady-state 
model.  This result can be established analytically in our model for the special case where 
patent life is infinite (see appendix). 
In contrast to the steady-state results, dynamic social welfare (in the partial 
equilibrium sense of the sum of the present values of consumer and producer surpluses) 
actually increases as the royalty increases in the case illustrated.  From society’s 
viewpoint, the speed-up of the first innovation, encouraged by the prospect of license 
fees, dominates the later negative effect of the lower steady-state innovation rate.  The 
first innovator will, if he or she has the bargaining power, choose a royalty rate around 
0.4 (Figure 6) to maximize the present value of producer surplus, which in this case 
constitutes the maximum of the dynamic social welfare.   
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Figure 6  Social welfare under alternative royalty rates 
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For the combination of parameter values, longer patent life always increases 
dynamic social welfare.  Were patent life shortened, the social gain would be lower, but 
consumers would be major beneficiaries at sufficiently low patent life.
19  As the patent 
life increases, expected consumer surplus is more discounted and the producer surplus 
takes the larger portion of the social welfare.  
EFFECTS OF A TAX ON BEHALF OF FARMERS’ RIGHTS  
The financing of a fund for farmers’ rights, confirmed at the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in 1992, has been hampered due to lack of legal enforcement. Though the details on 
the implementation of farmers' rights are vague, one suggested proposal for financing the fund 
is to levy taxes on commercial seeds.  Though this scheme is often criticized on the grounds 
that it would be the farmers themselves who would finally finance the fund, it certainly is 
one feasible mechanism through which the fund could be established.  
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Imagine a fixed amount of tax assessment on the first successful innovator in a 
previously open access system in plant genetic resources.  If the tax is levied when the 
innovation for the first patent is made, the present value of this fixed tax for farmers’ 
rights is highest under the royalty rate chosen by the first innovator￿say 0.4 in Figure 
7￿in spite of a fixed amount of tax.  The reason is that a positive royalty encourages a 
higher initial hazard rate for the first innovation, and so the delay before payment of the 
tax is lower, so its present value rises.  In Figure 7, the tax assessment, which maximizes 
its present value of the tax revenue, occurs when a = 0.4.  This size is identical to the 
present value of initial royalty revenue when the rate is chosen by the first innovator to 
optimize his or her income from subsequent royalties, given patent life T. 
Thus, optimization of the tax for farmers’ rights in this model reduces the 
dynamic social welfare by setting the first innovation effort at its steady-state level. 
Without the initial boost in innovation induced by a new patent regime, the rate of search 
is initially lower, cost reductions are delayed, and social welfare declines.  In this 
parameterization, much of the loss is borne by the effort of the suppliers of research in 
the form of a reduction in expected first-period producer surplus.  For other 
parameterizations, the details of incidence could be substantially different. 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 In this model, consumers gain only after a patent expires, so shorter patent lives 
are more attractive up to the point where the incentive to innovate becomes too small.  
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Figure 7  Fixed tax on the first innovator: Dynamic effects 
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Rapid changes are occurring throughout the world in property rights protection, 
especially with respect to agricultural genetic resources and biotechnology. With the 
initiation or strengthening of property rights in genetic resources, innovators have the 
opportunity to use high-yield breeding material developed by public investment from a 
foundation of farmers’ varieties and wild varieties to develop new, even higher-yield 
varieties that can be exploited like other private intellectual property.  
In exploiting this dynamic property opportunity, private breeders maximize their 
profits by initiating a chain of licensing payments that can reduce subsequent yield increases 
relative to the open-access case.  Nevertheless, the high dynamic incentive associated with the 
privatization of genetic innovations can increase dynamic social welfare if it dominates the 
discounted effect of subsequent permanent slowdown in innovation.  Existing studies that focus 
on the steady-state innovation will provide a misleading policy option, and the balance of the 
incentives between the first innovator and the subsequent innovator should be carefully 
taken into account in the design of patent policy.  
The providers of the original genetic resources are naturally anxious to claim part 
of the windfall from the privatization of the chain of innovation initiated by those 
resources.  But if they achieve their compensation by taxing current innovators, the 
dynamic social benefits of privatization are reduced, even though the longer innovation 
rate might be unaffected.  It is likely that alternative means of compensation could be 
found that are more efficient.  These general effects of policy changes relating to patent 
rights should be of interest to those concerned with innovative incentives in other areas in 
which progress is cumulative.  
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Our conclusion is based on a very simple dynamic model, and several extensions 
are possible.  First, other market structures such as monopoly or oligopoly may be 
instructive, considering the current trend of merger in the biotechnology and plant 
breeding industry.  And, instead of a compulsory royalty rate, an assumption of an 
efficient bargaining on the royalty rate among successive innovators is another extension 
of our model (O’Donoghue et al. 1998).  If the bargaining among innovators is allowed, 
the optimal royalty rate of a steady-state innovator depends on the overhang period from 
the previous patent.  Though patent scope is implicitly included as the size of the royalty 
rate a in our model, we can also explicitly include the patent scope as the probability of 
next innovation.  If the scope is narrow, the subsequent innovation is likely to be outside 
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